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Abstract
Recent Continental European scholarship has identified a problematic Anglocentric bias running 
through the field of comparative plural policing studies. It has sought to counter this bias by 
emphasizing a series of divergent plural policing trajectories between the more market-friendly 
countries in the Anglosphere and the more state-centric countries in Continental Europe. While 
acknowledging the significance of this corrective, we argue that it tends to overemphasize the 
levels of divergence between these two regions. We substantiate this claim by examining the 
rise of the private security industry and its regulation by the state in the UK (representing 
the Anglosphere) and Belgium (representing Continental Europe). Interpreting historical and 
contemporary data through Sabatier and Weible’s advocacy coalition framework, which focuses 
on the cut and thrust of democratic politics, we observe how in both countries this important 
dimension of the plural policing landscape is characterized not by counterposed market-friendly 
and state-centric trajectories, but rather by a complex mix of state–market interactions. In other 
words, the dynamics of private security regulation are more state-centric in the UK and more 
market-friendly in Belgium than recent Continental European scholarship suggests. Moreover, 
we illustrate how, under conditions of post-financial crisis austerity, the overarching pattern is, if 
anything, one of convergence towards a common set of political dynamics. This is an important 
finding that not only makes an original contribution towards private security regulation scholarship 
but also encourages us to question the nature of Anglocentric bias within comparative plural 
policing studies.
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Introduction
It is a truism that policing is no longer the exclusive domain of the police. In most coun-
tries, key functions such as patrol, protection, investigation and detention are increas-
ingly carried out by a range of public, private and third sector actors working in 
collaboration and competition with one another. Over the past couple of decades, schol-
ars have responded to this trend by exploring what is commonly termed the ‘pluraliza-
tion of policing’. It is notable, however, that most contributions to this scholarship draw 
from the empirical dynamics of single countries. There is a notable dearth of compara-
tive analysis (De Maillard and Roché, 2018: 385; Jones and Newburn, 2006: 1). 
Moreover, the comparative analysis that does exist is often regarded as Anglocentric in 
orientation, giving rise to a geographically biased reading of the plural policing land-
scape (Devroe, 2017; Terpstra, 2017; Van Stokkom and Terpstra, 2018). In an effort to 
counter this bias, recent years have witnessed a new wave of comparative plural policing 
scholarship rooted in the experiences of Continental Europe, in particular Austria, 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands (De Maillard and Zagrodzki, 2017; Devroe, 2017; 
O’Neill and Fyfe, 2017; Terpstra, 2017; Van Steden, 2017). One of the headline findings 
in this scholarship is that, whereas the more market-friendly countries in the Anglosphere 
generally exhibit high levels of pluralization across the public/private divide, the more 
state-centric countries in Continental Europe usually display lower levels of pluraliza-
tion across the public/private divide. This divergence is then used to redraw the 
Anglocentric map of the plural policing landscape.
While acknowledging the significance of this corrective, we contend that it often 
overemphasizes the levels of divergence between the Anglosphere and Continental 
Europe. We substantiate this claim by re-examining a key set of variables in this com-
parative scholarship – namely, the rise of the private security industry and its regulation 
by the state in the UK (representing the Anglosphere) and Belgium (representing 
Continental Europe). Interpreting historical and contemporary data through Sabatier and 
Weible’s (2007) advocacy coalition framework, which focuses on the cut and thrust of 
democratic politics, we observe how in both countries this important dimension of the 
plural policing landscape is characterized not by counterposed market-friendly and state-
centric trajectories, but rather by a complex mix of state–market interactions. Although 
notable divergences certainly exist, it is apparent that private security regulation is more 
state-centric in the UK and more market-friendly in Belgium than recent comparative 
scholarship suggests. Moreover, we illustrate how, under conditions of post-financial 
crisis austerity, the overarching pattern across these two countries is, if anything, one of 
convergence towards a common set of political dynamics. This is a significant counter-
corrective. It suggests that, rather than reproducing a market-friendly depiction of the 
Anglosphere and then challenging the analytical reach of this depiction by emphasizing 
incongruencies with a state-centric portrayal of Continental Europe, we should remain 
cognizant of the commonalities in plural policing arrangements across these two regions. 
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It further implies that we should continue to embrace an open orientation towards the 
transfer of analytical and practical plural policing knowledge between the Anglosphere 
and Continental Europe. In sum, then, we advance an empirically and theoretically novel 
comparison of private security regulation in the UK and Belgium that questions what we 
regard as an emergent misunderstanding in the extant comparative plural policing 
scholarship.
We develop this line of argumentation over five sections. The next section critically 
reviews this recent comparative scholarship. The subsequent section sketches out our 
theoretical and methodological approach. The following two sections use the advocacy 
coalition framework to compare private security regulation in the UK and Belgium. The 
final section reflects on both the divergences and the convergences in the dynamics of 
private security regulation across these two countries, before reflecting upon the nature 
of Anglocentrism in plural policing studies.
Comparative plural policing scholarship
As the pluralization of policing has gathered momentum across the globe, it has become 
ever more important to identify patterns of convergence and divergence so we can better 
understand not just the reasons behind these trajectories but also the extent to which we 
can and should draw lessons between them. Yet only a small proportion of the now quite 
extensive scholarship on plural policing is explicitly comparative in nature. As De 
Maillard and Roché (2018: 385) observe: ‘it is rarely cross-nationally comparative . . . it 
rarely relies on a systematic analysis of national realities to identify similarities and dif-
ferences.’ It is further noted that the comparative scholarship that does exist is predomi-
nantly Anglocentric in orientation (Devroe, 2017; Terpstra, 2017; Van Stokkom and 
Terpstra, 2018). This is because the pioneering studies in this field have focused on 
Canada, the US and the UK (Jones and Newburn, 2002; Shearing and Stenning, 1981), 
generating a longstanding bias towards this region of the globe. Unsurprisingly, this bias 
has come to be regarded as an issue. According to Van Stokkom and Terpstra (2018: 
418), for instance, the main ‘problem’ in this subfield is the ‘dominance of Anglocentrism’. 
They continue:
[N]ot only do many researchers in the U.S. and England (presumably implicitly) assume that 
their arrangements and problems are universal, this dominance is so strong that even researchers 
from other countries may be inclined to accept theories and interpretations from the English-
speaking world as if they also apply to their own situation, even if this may be unclear or 
questionable.
For them, this Anglocentric bias has (unintentionally) distorted how we make sense of 
the plural policing landscape.
In recent years, a new wave of Continental European scholarship has made significant 
progress in exposing the contours of this bias through an exploration of plural policing 
trajectories in Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands (De Maillard and Zagrodzki, 
2017; Devroe, 2017; O’Neill and Fyfe, 2017; Terpstra, 2017; Van Steden, 2017). For 
present purposes, the most salient dimension of this scholarship is the notable diver-
gences it reveals between these countries and the Anglosphere. These divergences are 
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exposed in a number of ways. One approach is to question the degree to which models of 
plural policing formulated within the Anglosphere can be applied to Continental Europe. 
Taking issue with the nodal governance model, for instance, Terpstra (2017: 79) observes 
how, ‘in the continental European context, the state is not only more than “just one node 
among many” . . . given the historical context of these countries it is seen as very risky 
to distribute policing and policing powers across a wide range of actors’. Another 
approach is to draw broad empirical comparisons between countries from each region. In 
this vein, Devroe (2017: 97) remarks how ‘the Belgian case study shows a deviation 
from the central Anglophilic statement stipulating that industrialised countries are 
becoming increasingly “pluralised-privatised”. Fierce opposition in Belgium has 
obstructed the trend towards pluralisation that is present in the UK.’ A final approach is 
to draw specific empirical comparisons relating to one particular dimension of the plural 
policing landscape. Button and Stiernstedt (2018), for example, rank 26 European Union 
members in terms of how comprehensively each state regulates its domestic private 
security industry, finding that Belgium occupies first place, leading a pack of Continental 
European countries, with the UK down in 20th position (Button and Stiernstedt, 2018: 
404; see also Scheerlinck et al., 2020). They note how these findings corroborate Button’s 
earlier analyses, which, among other things, ‘highlight the disparities between the gener-
ally highly regulated mainland European countries and the minimal Anglo-Saxon mod-
els in England and Wales, North America and Australia’ (Button, 2007: 124).
As such, one of the key messages running through this scholarship is that, whereas the 
more market-friendly countries in the Anglosphere are generally characterized by high 
levels of pluralization across the public/private divide (including relatively light-touch 
models of private security regulation), the more statist-centric countries in Continental 
Europe are usually defined by lower levels of pluralization across the public/private 
divide (including more comprehensive models of private security regulation). This 
means, so the logic continues, we should be wary of transferring analytical and practical 
plural policing knowledge between the Anglosphere and Continental Europe. This mes-
sage is persuasive and represents a significant advance in the field of comparative plural 
policing studies. At the same time, though, we believe this scholarship tends to overem-
phasize the levels of divergence between plural policing trajectories in the Anglosphere 
and Continental Europe. It proceeds by reproducing a market-friendly depiction of the 
Anglosphere and then challenges the analytical reach of this depiction by emphasizing 
incongruencies with a state-centric portrayal of Continental Europe. In our view, this is 
an oversimplification. The Anglosphere is often more state-centric and Continental 
Europe is often more market-friendly than this line of reasoning suggests. There is, in 
other words, a common ground across these two regions that has been left out of the 
picture. Our intention here is to bring this common ground into frame, in the process 
questioning the nature of Anglocentrism in plural policing studies.
To accomplish this task, we focus on a specific set of variables: the rise of the private 
security industry and its regulation by the state in the UK (representing the Anglosphere) 
and Belgium (representing Continental Europe). We have selected these variables pre-
cisely because they play a central role in the recent comparative scholarship under 
examination. As the above literature review demonstrates, they are cited as key exam-
ples when emphasizing divergences between the market-friendly trajectories in the 
Anglosphere and state-centric trajectories in Continental Europe. Using these same 
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variables to illustrate not just known divergences in state-market trajectories but also 
important convergences serves, we think, as an illuminating mode of critique. It meets 
this recent comparative scholarship largely on its own terms, rather than reshuffling the 
deck, so to speak. Of course, this also raises the question of how we can examine the 
same key variables and yet arrive at a different interpretation. The answer lies in our 
choice of theoretical lens.
Theory and method
The comparative scholarship that ranks European Union members according to how 
comprehensively each state regulates its domestic private security industry (Button, 
2007; Button and Stiernstedt, 2018; Scheerlinck et al., 2020) is not presented through an 
explicit theoretical lens. But this does not mean it is atheoretical. It is informed – con-
sciously or not – by what Rhodes (1997) terms the ‘formal-legal’ approach to state regu-
lation. This approach sees ‘legal rules and procedures as the basic independent variable, 
and the functioning and fate of democracies as the dependent variable’ (Rhodes, 1997: 
67). Understood thus, less state regulation equates to a freer market and higher levels of 
pluralization across the public/private divide, whereas more state regulation equates to a 
more controlled market and lower levels of pluralization across the public/private divide 
– hence the divergence between the Anglosphere and Continental Europe in the above 
rankings. Although it is of course important to explore state regulation in this way – and 
we certainly do not deny the existence of the legal divergences it identifies – this approach 
does not tell the whole story. It lacks an appreciation of the manifold ways in which state 
regulation is interpreted and negotiated by stakeholders on the ground. This is a notable 
blind spot because, once this ground-level agency is taken into account, the extent to 
which state regulation takes on a market-friendly or state-centric character begins to 
change. In what follows, we put this agency front and centre. It is this emphasis on the 
cut and thrust of democratic politics – as opposed to the codification of legal rules and 
procedures – that allows us to arrive at a different interpretation of the same key varia-
bles. To bring coherence to this theoretical approach, we draw upon the advocacy coali-
tion framework (ACF).
Over the past three decades, the ACF has emerged as an important alternative to the 
formal-legal approach. For present purposes, we use a simplified version of Sabatier and 
Weible’s (2007) iteration, which runs as follows. Whenever public, private and/or third 
sector actors enter into a policy arena – such as private security regulation – they are first 
guided by their beliefs. These beliefs find articulation at different levels: at a ‘deep’ level 
they give expression to a fundamental conviction on any particular issue; at a ‘secondary’ 
level they reflect a strategic reading of those policies that are most likely to serve this 
conviction. To advance their beliefs, these actors team up with similarly minded allies in 
multi-sectoral networks – or ‘advocacy coalitions’. The interplay between different coa-
litions gives initial direction to the policy process. Over time, this interplay is then fur-
ther shaped by two other meta-variables: the distribution of resources across coalitions, 
which includes not just ‘legal rules and procedures’ but also public support, expertise, 
cash and charisma; and changes to the political environment both inside the policy arena 
(for example, localized scandals) and outside (such as economic crises and changes in 
government). When all these moving parts are considered together, they give rise to a 
6 European Journal of Criminology 00(0)
pluralistic, agentic and open-ended reading of the policy arena – one driven not by ‘for-
mal-legal’ state-centric hierarchies but rather by the interplay between different advo-
cacy coalitions in an ever-changing political environment.
Over subsequent sections, we first use these theoretical propositions to identify three 
advocacy coalitions in the UK and Belgian private security regulation policy arenas: the 
‘reformers’, who believe in the supremacy of state over market in the policing landscape 
(at a deep level) and seek to control the private security industry through state regulation 
(at a secondary level); the ‘legitimators’, who see a prominent role for both state and 
market in the policing landscape (at a deep level) and look to enhance the comparatively 
diminished status of the industry through state regulation (at a secondary level); and the 
‘free marketeers’, who likewise see a prominent role for both state and market in the 
policing landscape (at a deep level), but view this as best accomplished by opposing state 
regulation and/or deregulating the industry (at a secondary level) (see also White, 2018). 
For a summary of these coalitions, see Table 1. We then use these propositions to trace 
the interplay between these coalitions over time, as they negotiate their way through a 
series of changes both inside and outside their policy arenas.
This approach, we reason, can be used to shed new light on the dynamics of private 
security regulation. If we were, for instance, to use as our compass the formal-legal 
approach, set against the backdrop of the recent comparative plural policing scholarship, 
we would expect to find the free marketeers controlling the UK policy arena and the 
reformers dominating the Belgian policy arena. This would fit with the emergent pattern 
identified in this field of research. Significantly, though, this is not the pattern we reveal 
over the following sections. Through our application of the ACF, we instead uncover a 
complex interplay between all three coalitions – and the different state–market balances 
they represent – over different periods of time, with notable convergences under the 
present conditions of post-financial crisis austerity. This is an important finding that not 
only makes an original contribution to private security regulation scholarship more spe-
cifically but holds notable implications for comparative plural policing scholarship more 
broadly, as we discuss later. To clarify, though, we are not asserting that our approach is 
intrinsically superior to the formal-legal one. Nor that it somehow ‘completes’ the story 
of private security regulation in the UK and Belgium – there are other key variables in 
play, not least different political economic backdrops across these two countries, which 
also inform the state–market balances under examination (see Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
We are simply arguing that the cut and thrust of democratic politics – and the 
Table 1. Advocacy coalitions in the private security regulation policy arena.




Reformers Strong state with 
controlled market
State regulation State-centric
Legitimators State partnership with 
controlled market
State regulation Market-friendly 
and state-centric
Free marketeers State partnership with 
free market
Self-regulation Market-friendly
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convergences it brings into view – should be given careful consideration because of the 
fresh insights it brings to these discussions.
Before turning to our two case studies, however, it is necessary to explain the origins 
of our comparative dataset. It is made up of two parts. The UK part comprises: archival 
material from the Home Office, the police and the private security industry covering the 
post-1945 era; an extensive review of primary and secondary literatures on UK plural 
policing; and 82 semi-structured interviews with representatives from the UK govern-
ment, the police and the private security industry conducted between 2006 and 2014 (for 
more detailed methodological discussion, see White, 2010, 2014, 2015a). The Belgian 
part comprises: archival material from the Belgian Private Security Directorate, the 
police and the private security industry covering most of the 20th century; an extensive 
review of primary and secondary literatures on Belgian plural policing; and 23 semi-
structured interviews with representatives from the Belgian public and private security 
sectors conducted in the first quarter of 2020 (for a more detailed methodological discus-
sion, see Leloup, 2021). These different parts were initially collected through separate 
research projects (see funder acknowledgements below), which has (perhaps inevitably) 
resulted in certain disparities when synthesized into a single comparative dataset – as we 
are doing here. The most robust component is the complementary archival material set 
against the backdrop of the extensive literature reviews. As a consequence, it is this com-
ponent we rely upon the most when reconstructing the interplay between different advo-
cacy coalitions in the UK and Belgium. The interview data are less well aligned, with 
discrepancies in terms of both volume and temporality. Recognizing this issue, we pri-
marily use these data for purposes of behind-the-scenes understanding and triangulation, 
and for the most part we refrain from using direct quotes from these interviews. We are 
confident that these decisions enable us to draw reliable comparative inferences from our 
dataset. With these methodological considerations in mind, we now switch over to 
empirical matters, turning first to the UK case study and then the Belgian one. Briefly, 
though, it is important to emphasize that, for ease of comparison, each case study not 
only focuses on the interplay between the same three advocacy coalitions over time but 
is also divided into the same five chronologically ordered sub-sections: context, coalition 
formation, regulation, austerity and state–market balance.
United Kingdom
Context
Although localized private security arrangements were commonplace throughout the UK 
in the 19th and early 20th centuries – with locks, safes, alarms, watchmen and guards 
readily available to the wealthier and commercial classes (Churchill, 2017) – the large 
private security companies that dominate the industry today, such as G4S, Mitie and 
Securitas, did not emerge until the postwar era. By 2013, the industry had an estimated 
annual turnover of €3.97 billion and employed 364,753 private security officers – more 
than twice the number of police officers, which stood at 162,324 (Confederation of 
European Security Services [CoESS], 2013).1 Since the turn of the 21st century, the 
industry has been regulated by the Security Industry Authority (SIA) – a public body 
underpinned by the Private Security Industry Act 2001 and accountable to the Home 
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Office – which is tasked with reducing criminality and raising standards across the sec-
tor. To do this, the SIA licenses individual private security officers in line with ‘fit and 
proper’ person criteria and training requirements. However, the SIA is not empowered to 
license companies themselves – a vacuum that places significant limits on its regulatory 
capacity (White, 2015b). As previous sections have demonstrated, the combination of an 
established private security industry dominated by large multinational companies and a 
comparatively light-touch system of state regulation has prompted many scholars to 
characterize plural policing – and more specifically private security regulation – in the 
UK as straightforwardly market-friendly in orientation. We view this as a misrepresenta-
tion, however. The interplay between advocacy coalitions in this policy arena reveals a 
series of state-centric ideals and calculations that challenge this depiction.
Coalition formation
The decades immediately following World War II are often referred to as the ‘postwar 
consensus’ – a period marked by a widespread belief in the capacity of the social 
democratic state to distribute goods and services throughout economy and society. 
Significantly, it was this backdrop that gave rise to the ‘golden age’ of the police. As 
Reiner (2010: 68) puts it: ‘the relative social harmony and consensus of the mid-
twentieth century, symbolized by the Battle of Britain and the Festival of Britain, was 
also the finest hour of the British bobby myth.’ This deep-seated cultural attachment to 
the police – or ‘police fetishism’ (Reiner, 2010) – held notable implications for the 
nascent private security industry and the question of regulation. For present purposes, 
the most salient implications relate to how these sentiments shaped the deep and sec-
ondary beliefs of two emergent advocacy coalitions in the private security regulation 
policy arena: the reformers and the legitimators.
The reformers comprised politicians from all parties alongside senior police officers. 
At a deep level, they believed in the supremacy of the state in the policing landscape. At 
a secondary level, they supported the introduction of statutory regulation to control and 
limit the activities of the private security industry. Their primary concern, as one 
Conservative MP succinctly exclaimed in an unsuccessful 1969 Bill, was that ‘there is no 
one available to keep an eye on the “private eye”’.2 The legitimators were also made up 
of politicians from all parties, but included senior industry executives as well. At a deep 
level, they believed in a prominent role for both state and market in the policing land-
scape. At a secondary level, they supported the introduction of statutory regulation to 
imbue private security companies with the quality of ‘stateness’ – a highly prized attrib-
ute in a landscape shot through with police fetishism. Their agenda is neatly captured by 
another Conservative MP (who also served on Group 4’s board of directors) in a further 
unsuccessful Bill four years later:
We must all learn to take crime prevention more seriously. If that is the case the private security 
industry will have an increasingly important part to play. This part should be encouraged and 
the intention of the Bill is to encourage good security firms and to ensure high standards.3
This means that, although these two advocacy coalitions contrasted in their interpretation 
of the state–market balance, they came together in their support of statutory regulation. 
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During the 1960s and 1970s, they both consolidated their identities and accumulated 
resources, gradually shaping the terms of debate in the private security regulation policy 
arena, most notably when certain reformers and legitimators teamed up in 1977 to spon-
sor two more pro-regulation Bills in the House of Commons.4 At this time, however, they 
had not quite yet built sufficient momentum to alter the free market status quo.
During the 1980s, the fortunes of these advocacy coalitions started to wane. The neo-
liberal policy turn – embodied in four successive Conservative governments – privileged 
the distributive capacity of the market over the state, fostering the emergence of another 
advocacy coalition: the free marketeers. The free marketeers comprised Conservative 
politicians and industry representatives, many of whom were former legitimators. At a 
deep level, they believed in a prominent role for both state and market in the policing 
landscape. At a secondary level, they championed the unfettered marketplace and 
opposed regulation. Although they recognized the presence of ‘police fetishism’, they 
did not regard it as a constraint that needed to be overcome by enhancing the ‘stateness’ 
of the industry through regulation. Moreover, given their roots in the government, the 
free marketeers were able to keep regulation firmly off the negotiating table. For exam-
ple, when questioned about evidence of malpractice in the industry towards the end of 
the decade, members of the Conservative government – including the Home Secretary – 
repeatedly asserted their conviction that the rigors of market competition represented the 
best solution.5
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, though, a series of scandals realigned the interplay 
between these three advocacy coalitions. In 1988, the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) uncovered substantial evidence of criminality in the industry (ACPO, 
1988). Then in 1989 a Royal Marine barracks in Deal protected by Reliance Security was 
bombed by the Irish Republican Army, killing 11 marines and seriously injuring 22 oth-
ers. Reliance Security – and the private security industry more generally – received 
damning coverage in the media, with one article in The Independent reporting how ‘some 
guards refused to patrol the graveyard because they believed it was haunted’ (O’Sullivan, 
1989: 2). Lastly, in 1993 Group 4 commenced a Home Office contract worth £9.5 million 
per year to escort prisoners between police stations, courts and prisons and accidentally 
allowed seven prisoners to escape in the first few days, drawing yet more criticism. 
These events re-energized and augmented the membership of the reformers (who saw a 
need to better control the industry) and the legitimators (who saw a need to enhance the 
status of the industry through a symbolic association with the state). During the 1989–90 
parliamentary session the government was required to provide no fewer than 13 written 
answers on the matter of private security regulation, and, in the three years after the Deal 
bombing, four pro-regulation private members’ bills were introduced into the House of 
Commons, with two more following the Group 4 prisoner escapes (though none was suc-
cessful in securing a second reading).6 The momentum was moving from the free mar-
keteers towards the reformers and legitimators.
Regulation
Responding to this shift in momentum, in 1994 the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee launched an inquiry into private security regulation. The Committee received 
evidence from a wide range of stakeholders, with most industry representatives casting 
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themselves as legitimators and almost all other participants – including Members of 
Parliament, the Police Federation, the Police Superintendents’ Association and ACPO – 
joining together as reformers.7 Only the Conservative government – still animated by 
neoliberal free market ideals – bucked this trend by adopting a noncommittal stance.8 
After receiving evidence, the Committee concluded in favour of state regulation.9 
However, the Conservative government chose to remain silent on the issue. It was only 
after New Labour – now firmly aligned with the reformers – initiated an Opposition Day 
debate on the matter in early 1996 that the government was forced into action, publishing 
outline proposals for state regulation (Home Office, 1996).
In 1997, New Labour won a general election on the back of a manifesto promising a 
‘third way’ between state-centric and market-friendly policy paradigms. This approach 
played a vital role in translating the outgoing government’s tentative proposals into con-
crete legislation because it straddled the reformer and legitimator positions and thus 
received widespread support. This was evident in the new Home Secretary’s address at 
the 1997 British Security Industry Association (BSIA) annual luncheon, where he 
pledged to introduce ‘proper regulation’ to ‘get your industry onto a sound footing’ and 
‘restore public faith in your important role in the fight against crime’ (Straw, 1997). This 
rhetoric gave clear expression to the deep and secondary beliefs of the reformers and the 
legitimators, while paying scant attention to the corresponding beliefs of the free market-
eers. This new configuration of advocacy coalitions resulted in the relatively smooth 
passage of the long-awaited Private Security Industry Act 2001 into the statute books, 
though it would not usher in long-term stability in the policy arena – within just a few 
short years, unforeseen events would take over.
Austerity
The 2008 global financial crisis hit the British banking sector hard. In the ensuing tur-
moil, New Labour nationalized a number of banks, amounting to ‘the largest UK govern-
ment intervention in financial markets since the outbreak of the First World War’ (Bank 
of England, 2008). The 2010 general election unsurprisingly revolved around the issue 
of how to repair the resulting hole in the public finances. The Conservatives – who came 
to power as the senior partner in a coalition with the Liberal Democrats – pursued a text-
book neoliberal solution: downsize the state and remove market constraints to ease the 
burden on the Exchequer and stimulate economic growth. For present purposes, this 
agenda resulted in two notable developments. First, the central government police budget 
was immediately cut by £2.42 billion (in real terms) over the period 2010/11–2014/15, 
significantly reducing state capacity when responding to crime and disorder (Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary [HMIC] 2013: 15). Second, on 22 September 
2010, the BBC broke the news that the SIA – alongside 903 other regulatory bodies – 
was to ‘face axe in cost drive’ (Campbell, 2010), thereby freeing up market capacity in 
the same area of activity. In other words, the free marketeers had emphatically re-entered 
the policy arena with the full authority and resources of the government behind them.
The other two advocacy coalitions were not suddenly cast aside, however. The legiti-
mators in particular were vociferous in their reaction. Two days later, the Chairman of 
the Security Institute – a high-profile industry body – emphasized that regulation has 
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‘increased confidence and trust in the private security sector on the part of the police and, 
indeed, the public in general’. He continued: ‘Any steps taken which could damage such 
trust and confidence would, in our view, be a retrograde act’ (Security Management 
Today, 2010: para. 6). The message here is clear: far from representing burdensome red 
tape, state regulation had been instrumental in enhancing the status of the industry – an 
especially important consideration given the growing number of outsourcing opportuni-
ties coming from the budget-constrained police (White, 2014, 2015a). This was a widely 
held view, for all the main professional and trade bodies quickly joined forces in the pro-
regulation Security Alliance and sent a letter to the Home Secretary on 13 October 2010 
opposing abolition. The next day, the Cabinet Office released a brief statement announc-
ing that, rather than being abolished, the SIA would instead undergo a ‘phased transition 
to a new regime’. At the time of publication (May 2021), no such transition has taken 
place and the SIA continues to operate in line with the expectations of the reformers and 
legitimators.
State–market balance
We noted earlier that, if the divergent plural policing trajectories identified in recent 
comparative scholarship are to hold true, we would expect the private security regulation 
policy arena in the UK to be dominated by the free marketeers, whose primary and sec-
ondary beliefs align with a more market-friendly depiction of plural policing arrange-
ments. Interpreting our historical and contemporary data through the advocacy coalition 
model, we have now demonstrated that this is not necessarily the case. Although the free 
marketeers have certainly contributed significantly towards the dynamics of private 
security regulation in the UK, two other advocacy coalitions have played an equal if not 
more important role: the reformers, whose primary and secondary beliefs broadly align 
with a more state-centric depiction of plural policing arrangements; and the legitimators, 
whose primary and secondary beliefs combine market-friendly and state-centric ele-
ments. In other words, this supposedly market-friendly part of the plural policing land-
scape is more state-centric than recent comparative scholarship suggests. We now turn to 




Similar to the UK, localized private security arrangements first emerged in Belgium dur-
ing the early 20th century – primarily watchmen and guards employed in the maritime, 
commercial and financial districts of Antwerp and Brussels – with large private security 
companies such as G4S, Securitas and Seris (formerly Garde Maritime Industrielle et 
Commerciale) appearing in more recent decades (Leloup, 2015, 2017, 2021). However, 
owing to the lower number of market opportunities – in part a reflection of the smaller 
Belgian economy – these companies have not reached the same proportions as their UK 
counterparts. By 2013, the industry had an estimated annual turnover of €641.7 million 
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and employed 17,522 private security officers – less than half the number of police offic-
ers, which stood at 39,934 (CoESS, 2013). Interestingly, though, Belgium has a much 
longer history of private security regulation compared with the UK. To begin with, the 
anti-militia Law of 29 July 1934 and its extension of 4 May 1936 required companies to 
gain official authorization as ‘non-political organizations’. As the industry matured, this 
makeshift approach became ever more impractical, leading to the Law of 10 April 1990, 
which charged the Directorates Private Security and Private Security Control – both part 
of the Belgian Federal Public Service Home Affairs – with licensing individuals and 
companies in line with extensive quality control criteria. This legislation has subse-
quently been replaced by the Law of 2 October 2017, which streamlines the criteria 
enumerated in its predecessor. As earlier sections have illustrated, the combination of a 
relatively small private security industry together with a comparatively strict system of 
state regulation has caused numerous scholars to characterize plural policing – and more 
specifically private security regulation – in Belgium as state-centric in orientation. We 
regard this as a misinterpretation, however. The interplay between advocacy coalitions in 
this policy arena brings to light a series of market-friendly ideals and calculations that 
challenge this portrayal.
Coalition formation
Echoing the UK experience, the immediate postwar decades in Belgium were defined by 
a popular belief in the capacity of the corporatist welfare state to distribute goods and 
services across economy and society (De Preter, 2016). This did not, however, precipi-
tate a corresponding ‘golden age’ of the police. During this period the three police 
branches – municipal, judicial and military – were locked in often acrimonious competi-
tion over resources. To make matters worse, the military police were repeatedly accused 
of engaging in oppressive actions towards Belgian citizens, leading to numerous protests 
between the 1950s and 1970s (Van Outrive et al., 1991). As a consequence, the police did 
not accumulate the same degree of legitimacy as their UK cousins at this time. Importantly, 
though, cultural attachment to the institution was still sufficiently widespread to shape 
the deep and secondary beliefs of two nascent advocacy coalitions in the private security 
regulation policy arena: the reformers and the legitimators.
First on the scene in the 1960s was the Belgian permutation of the reformers, made up 
of magistrates from the public prosecutor’s office and civil servants from the Ministry of 
Justice. Like their UK equivalents, they believed in the supremacy of state over market 
in the policing landscape (at a deep level) and sought to control and limit the private 
security industry through state regulation (at a secondary level). Their immediate con-
cern was how to regulate the burgeoning industry using the Laws of 1934 and 1936, 
which were not actually designed for this purpose – indeed, these laws are perhaps best 
viewed as regulations that hold implications for the private security industry rather than 
bona fide private security regulation. They accomplished this task by adding quality 
control criteria to the process of authorizing companies as non-political organizations – 
though in due course they also started petitioning for new sector-specific legislation. 
During the 1970s, this coalition was joined by the Belgian iteration of the legitimators, 
mainly comprising industry executives lobbying through professional bodies such as the 
Leloup and White 13
Belgian Professional Association of Security Companies (BVBO-APEG). Like their UK 
contemporaries, they believed in a prominent role for both state and market in the polic-
ing landscape (at a deep level) and looked to enhance the comparatively diminished 
status of the industry through state regulation (at a secondary level). Although they saw 
benefits in the authorization process set out in the Laws of 1934 and 1936 – which as one 
industry executive explained in 1978 could be advertised as ‘proof that the Belgian state 
and authorities trust our private security companies’10 – they also began to lobby for new 
sector-specific legislation towards the end of the decade.11
As Belgium too went through something of an early 1980s neoliberal transformation 
(De Preter, 2016), one further advocacy coalition entered the policy arena – the Belgian 
incarnation of the free marketeers, principally made up of politicians and industry repre-
sentatives, many of whom were former legitimators. Like their UK counterparts, they 
interpreted the rise of neoliberalism as a sign that the industry no longer required state-
centric legitimation and could instead trade on its market credentials alone. Their initial 
objective was therefore to neutralize the Laws of 1934 and 1936 and to bring about a 
system of self-regulation. In 1981, for instance, the BVBO – which now housed both 
legitimators and free marketeers – pushed for ‘alternative solutions’ to these laws such as 
‘granting us an official statute’, which would definitively categorize the industry as ‘non-
political’ and therefore outside the scope of anti-militia legislation.12 Although the free 
marketeers represented an important voice during the early 1980s, a series of (discon-
nected) events around this time coalesced to privilege the pro-regulation agenda of the 
reformers and legitimators.
To begin with, this period witnessed a spate of violent attacks by far-right movements 
such as Vlaamse Militanten Orde, casting a shadow over private security companies that, 
through historical convention, still operated as ‘authorised private militias’ (Leloup, 
2021). This shadow was reinforced by a number of scandals surrounding the abusive 
practices of private security guards working for Wackenhut (Braeckman and De Kock, 
1980). Then in 1980 a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry was convened to address 
persistent issues of police corruption, bribery and ineffectiveness. Importantly, this 
Inquiry questioned the capacity of the police to control the private security industry in 
the absence of adequate state regulation and, at the same time, fostered debate about 
whether the industry should be employed to combat rising crime rates, challenging the 
hitherto dominant principle that policing ought to be the exclusive domain of the police.13 
These events not only prevented the free marketeers from realizing their objective of 
self-regulation but also galvanized the reformers and legitimators in their pursuit of new 
sector-specific regulation. In 1983, the Commission of Internal Affairs announced that 
new regulation would indeed be beneficial, ‘since their [the private security companies] 
resources and activities are becoming more and more important, and their sphere of 
actions is growing hugely’,14 setting the scene for the introduction of bona fide private 
security regulation.
Regulation
The first concrete step towards a new regulatory regime was taken in 1986 when the 
Ministry of Justice introduced the Gol Bill, which included, among other things, a 
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tailored system for regulating private security companies. Whereas the Bill was ten-
tatively welcomed by the reformers, the legitimators enthusiastically anticipated this 
legislation. For example, the Belgian Professional Association of Security and Alarm 
Companies (BBAB) – another prominent trade organization with a vocal legitimator 
membership – issued the following statement: ‘Good News! We hope so in any case! 
. . .. The law is in preparation and is expected to be ratified by the end of 1986. A 
historic moment that the professional security industry has been eagerly awaiting’ 
(BBAB, 1985: 1). Soon after, however, parliament descended into a political crisis, 
which lasted 182 days, ultimately stymying the Bill’s progress. Towards the end of 
the decade, a new centre–left government – a coalition of Flemish and French-
speaking Christian Democrats, Flemish and French-speaking Socialists and Flemish 
Nationalists – finally returned to the issue and duly passed the Law of 10 April 1990, 
which regulated individuals and companies operating under both contractual and 
inhouse arrangements. Reflecting the state-centric ideology of the government, this 
new sector-specific law was, in the words of the Minister of Internal Affairs, designed 
to ‘strictly control the private security companies and limit their growth’,15 and there-
fore reflected the deep and secondary beliefs of the reformers over those of the legiti-
mators and free marketeers. The reformers proceeded to dominate the policy arena 
throughout the 1990s, amending the law on a number of occasions to enhance its 
rigour (De Vroe, 2018).
Around the turn of the 21st century, however, events once again conspired to realign 
these advocacy coalitions. To begin with, a new spate of law enforcement scandals 
served to further damage police legitimacy. This resulted in the most extensive police 
reform in Belgian history (known as the 1998 Octopus Agreement) and the introduction 
of the community-oriented policing and integral security management model, which 
gave the market a more prominent role in combating crime and disorder (Ponsaers and 
De Kimpe, 2001). Furthermore, in 1999 a new coalition government led by the Liberal 
Party came to power espousing a more market-friendly approach to public service deliv-
ery. This ideological shift, combined with mounting pressures on police resources, trig-
gered the so-called Kerntakendebat – a further policy initiative that sought to identify 
‘non-core’ police functions suitable for outsourcing to the market (Cools, 2006). This 
new governmental emphasis on raising the status of the private security industry – as 
opposed to just ‘controlling and limiting’ it – augmented the position of both the legiti-
mators (who seized on the moment to lobby for more light-touch private security regula-
tion) and the free marketeers (who continued to champion self-regulatory initiatives). 
Indeed, capitalizing on these changes in the political climate, free marketeers in the 
BVBO doubled down on their efforts to persuade the government that they could operate 
‘self-regulation while upholding high standards and values’ (BVBO, 2006: 29). It would, 
however, require some even deeper ruptures in the Belgian political system before these 
two advocacy coalitions could make a decisive impact upon the legislative status quo.
Austerity
In 2008, the escalating global financial crisis reached Belgium too, prompting a massive 
publicly funded bailout of the banking sector and sending the country into a prolonged 
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period of austerity. To compound matters, the long-serving centrist coalition government 
was soon afterwards forced to resign following allegations of exercising unlawful politi-
cal influence, provoking a political crisis that lasted for almost two years. It was not until 
2011 that a new coalition government – comprising Flemish and French-speaking 
Socialists, Flemish and French-speaking Liberals and Flemish and French-speaking 
Christian Democrats – finally returned a sense of stability to the political scene. 
Reproducing the pattern of the previous decade, this government’s now austerity-driven 
strategy of reducing public spending and promoting public–private partnerships across 
the policing landscape continued to raise the profile of the legitimators and free market-
eers at the expense of the reformers.16 However, it would take one more change of gov-
ernment for legislative reform to take place.
In 2014, a new centre–right coalition government – made up of Flemish and French-
speaking Liberals, Flemish Nationalists and Flemish-speaking Christian Democrats – 
entered office on a market-friendly neoliberal platform. Against the backdrop of a 
systematic effort to make the state more ‘slim and efficient’,17 it evaluated the Law of 
1990 with the intention of simplifying private security regulation and creating more 
opportunities for the outsourcing of police functions to the market.18 This process was 
reinforced by the terrorist bombings of 22 March 2016, which concentrated already lim-
ited police resources in counter-terrorism units, leaving other units depleted and thus 
more open to cost-saving measures such as outsourcing. Seeing the tide turning against 
them, high-profile reformers began to raise concerns, with the Police Union pointedly 
questioning ‘if the objective of the Michel government is to hand over the Federal Police’s 
tasks to private security companies or to deliberately destroy this federal institution?’19 
Legislative reform was imminent. Just over a year later, the Law of 2 October 2017 came 
into effect, streamlining the now abandoned Law of 1990 and signalling a new approach 
to private security regulation. Its intention was no longer simply to protect the public 
from the industry, but rather to empower the industry. As one high-profile manager at 
G4S Belgium put it: ‘this is what the legislator wanted to achieve with the new private 
security regulation. They don’t want to make everything compulsory, but they want to 
provide a legal framework which the private sector can fill to a certain degree’ (Interview, 
2020). For its part, the government clearly hoped such market empowerment would, in 
the words of the Minister for Internal Affairs, ‘encourage the establishment of partner-
ships between the police and the private sector’ (BeSafe, 2017). These aspirational shifts 
in the state–market balance ultimately represent something of a compromise between the 
reformers, the legitimators and the free marketeers.
State–market balance
We remarked earlier that, if the divergent plural policing trajectories identified in recent 
comparative scholarship are to hold true, we would expect the private security regulation 
policy arena in Belgium to be dominated by the reformers, whose primary and secondary 
beliefs roughly align with a more state-centric depiction of plural policing arrangements. 
Analysing our historical and contemporary data through the advocacy coalition model, 
we have now illustrated how this is not the case. Although the reformers have certainly 
contributed significantly towards the dynamics of private security regulation in Belgium, 
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two other advocacy coalitions have also performed an important role: the free market-
eers, whose primary and secondary beliefs broadly align with a more market-friendly 
depiction of plural policing arrangements; and the legitimators, whose primary and sec-
ondary beliefs combine state-centric and market-friendly elements. To our minds, this 
supposedly state-centric part of the plural policing landscape is therefore more market-
friendly than the comparative scholarship examined above suggests.
Conclusion
Our comparative analysis demonstrates that, when private security regulation in the UK 
and Belgium is explored through the lens of the advocacy coalition framework, there is 
considerably more going on in terms of convergence and divergence than the formal-
legal approach suggests. To recap, the formal-legal approach focuses exclusively on 
‘legal rules and procedures’ and, as a consequence, brings to light divergences with 
regard to how private security regulation is codified in UK and Belgian statute books, 
with the former coming across as light-touch and market-friendly and the latter mani-
festing as heavy-handed and state-centric. In a sense, of course, this is quite true. When 
ranked in terms of legal comprehensiveness, the UK Private Security Industry Act 2001 
is indeed more laissez-faire than the Belgian Law of 2 October 2017. This is not the 
whole story, however. As we show in our re-examination of the same variables through 
the advocacy coalition framework, which focuses on the cut and thrust of democratic 
politics, the dynamics of private security regulation across these two countries have 
been animated by a distinctive set of advocacy coalitions – the reformers, the legitima-
tors and the free marketeers – each representing a specific state–market configuration. 
Although there have certainly been divergences in the relative influence of these coali-
tions over time – a corollary not just of the aforementioned legal contexts but also of 
different political economic backdrops (see Esping-Andersen, 1990) – there have also 
been numerous convergences (see Table 2). These have arisen because in each country 
the three coalitions have responded to shifts in their surrounding political environments 
at the local (legitimacy and scandals), national (electoral outcomes and legislative 
reform) and international (neoliberal turn and financial crisis) levels in remarkably sim-
ilar ways. Significantly, these convergences are most evident under present conditions 
of post-financial crisis austerity, with the three coalitions – and the state–market bal-
ances they represent – holding more or less equal sway in the UK and Belgian policy 
arenas. Indeed, with this in mind, we can actually push our analysis further by reassess-
ing the legal divergence identified within the formal-legal approach. Although on paper 
the Belgian Law of 2 October 2017 is certainly more state-centric than the UK Private 
Security Industry Act 2001, it is also more market-friendly than its predecessor (the 
Law of 10 April 1990), reflecting the interplay of coalitions at the time of its inception. 
This has served to reduce the legal gap between the two regimes. In other words, under 
conditions of post-financial crisis austerity, there has been not only political conver-
gence across the UK and Belgian private security regulation policy arenas, but legal 
convergence too.
Although these findings make an original contribution to private security regulation 
scholarship more specifically, they also hold notable implications for recent comparative 
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plural policing scholarship more broadly, which takes us back to our starting point in this 
article. As we noted earlier, this scholarship has exposed the contours of Anglocentric 
bias in this field by emphasizing a divergent set of plural policing trajectories in the 
Anglosphere and in Continental Europe. It has accomplished this by essentially repro-
ducing a market-friendly depiction of the Anglosphere and then challenging the analyti-
cal reach of this depiction by emphasizing incongruencies with a state-centric portrayal 
of Continental Europe. This line of enquiry has undoubtedly led to significant insights, 
but our comparative analysis suggests that it has a tendency towards overcorrecting for 
the biases it seeks to address. The preceding sections show that, although there are indeed 
divergences in plural policing arrangements across these two regions, there are also 
important convergences. There is common ground. Of course, our analysis is a partial 
one: it focuses on just one country from each region; it concentrates on a single strand of 
the heterogeneous plural policing landscape; and it is shaped by a particular theoretical 
framework. We are not therefore claiming that convergences between the Anglosphere 
and Continental Europe are ubiquitous or that the advances made in recent comparative 
plural policing scholarship need to be undone. Nor indeed are we intimating that the 
Anglocentric bias running through this field of research is not real – it most certainly is. 
But we are asserting that we need to be careful in how we handle and correct for these 
biases. In particular, we must not lose sight of the convergences across these two regions 
and we should, by extension, remain open to the transfer of analytical and practical plural 
policing knowledge between the Anglosphere and Continental Europe.
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 1. We are using CoESS (2013) to sketch out the size of the industry because this is the most up-
to-date source that provides directly comparable data across the UK and Belgium. For more 
recent data on the UK industry, see White (2020).
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 3. HC Deb (1972–73) vol. 859, col. 537.
 4. HC Bill (1976–7) [62]; HC Bill (1976–7) [114].
 5. HC Deb (1988–89), vol. 146, col. 411; HC Deb (1988–89), vol. 149, col. 598.
 6. HC Deb (1989–90), vol. 163, written answers, col. 391; HC Deb (1989–90), vol. 164, writ-
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(1989–90), vol. 168, written answers, col. 72; HC Deb (1989–90), vol. 168, written answers, 
col. 86; HC Deb (1989–90), written answers, vol. 168, col. 103; HC Deb (1989–90), vol. 169, 
written answers, col. 756; HC Deb (1989–90), vol. 170, written answers, col. 372; HC Deb 
(1989–90), vol. 171, written answers, col. 99; HC Deb (1989–90), vol. 173, written answers, 
col. 172; HC Deb (1989–90), vol. 176, written answers, col. 119; HC Deb (1989–90), vol. 
177, written answers, col. 261; HC Deb (1989–90), vol. 177, written answers, col. 471. The 
bills are: HC Bill (1988–89) (214); HC Bill (1989–90) (55); HC Bill (1989–90) (148); HC 
Bill (1991–92) (58); HC Bill (1993–94) (108); HC Bill (1994–95) (170).
 7. HC 17-II (1994–95).
 8. HC 17-II (1994–95), pp. 40–47.
 9. HC 17-I (1994–95).
10. AGSP (Archives General State Police), File ‘Private Militias’, RTB interview, 16 March 
1978.
11. AGSP, MO/117-3 Nouvelle Société de Surveillance et de Sécurité, Letter to General State 
Police, 19 October 1977.
12. AGSP, MO/117-2 GMIC, Letter to General State Police, 24 September 1981.
13. Ontwerp van wet houdende verscheidene maatregelen ter verhoging van de veiligheid van de 
burger, Parl. St. Senaat 1985–1986, 4 June 1986, 298-1, 1.
14. Begroting van het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken voor het begrotingsjaar 1983, Verslag 
namens de Commissie voor de Binnenlandse Zaken, de Algemene Zaken en het Openbaar 
Ambt uitgebracht door de heer Cardoen, Parl. St. Kamer 1982–1983, 4-VII no. 10, 15.
15. Ontwerp van wet op de bewakingsondernemingen, de beveiligingsondernemingen en de 
interne bewakingsdiensten. Voorstel van wet houdende regeling van het particuliere geldtrans-
port, Verslag Pinoie, Parl. St. Senaat 1989–1990, 1 February 1990, 775-2, 4.
16. Governmental Agreement, 2011.
17. Governmental Agreement, 2014, 18–19.
18. Governmental Agreement, 2014, 134.
19. De Morgen, Politiebonden dreigen met staking, 1 March 2017.
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